Could 2026 be Europe’s year? This may seem an outlandish proposition, given how a continent lacking in geopolitical muscle, industrial strength and technological autonomy is facing the combined onslaught of Russian aggression, American dominance and Chinese mercantilism. It may seem a naïve aspiration, given how a European Union built for globalization is at the mercy of fragmented national sovereignty in its search for collective hard power. Indeed, if Germany and France can’t even agree on a joint fighter programme, if the European Union’s very own diplomatic service can’t be allowed to rise to the occasion and face the return of history in Europe, how can Europe hope to overcome its geopolitical vulnerability through unity? 

Yet despite all its handicaps and the occasional setback, Europe is quietly on a roll – for now.

A year ago, European leaders bent the knee, choosing self-humiliation for the sake of self-preservation in the face of a Donald Trump holding all the cards. Today, Ukraine is fighting Russia into a stalemate with European funds and with domestic drone technology that is becoming a cornerstone of European defence capabilities. Donald Trump remains more inclined towards the Kremlin than towards Kyiv or Brussels, but that matters less than before. His diplomacy of Russian appeasement, Ukrainian abandonment and European humiliation has become disconnected from reality. 

On Ukraine, Europe was always on the menu but never at the table. With the United States frustrated and distracted in the Middle East, with Trumpian appeasement triggering Putinesque intransigence, Europe now has a window of opportunity to claim a seat and alter the menu. Europe’s leading nations seem ready to play ball, the E3 of Germany, France and the UK emerging as a tentative new engine connecting the European Union with its geostrategic near abroad. Greenland and Iran may well have proved a psychological watershed. European leaders have learned to say no to the United States and emerge vindicated – no matter how much Trump may declare triumph over Iran. After the Greenland scare, Trump’s threats to NATO sound empty. Europe is moving on, accepting that the United States remains essential but not necessarily indispensable.

In the meantime, behind the façade of perennial intra-European diplomacy, a geoeconomic Europe is gradually taking shape. The European Union is designing its architecture. Abroad, a string of recent geopolitical trade deals – with India, the Mercosur bloc, Australia, Indonesia, and now Canada. At home, a fledgling industrial strategy built around European defence, economic security, strategic autonomy, energy, and technological sovereignty. A growing repertoire of economic sanctions, tariffs, quotas, anti-dumping measures and carbon taxes stands ready to shape the former in service of the latter. 

Of course, much of the actual action remains with member states who still hold much of the political and financial clout. But action it is, at long last, and at scale. Germany is frantically building Europe’s largest military-industrial complex, France the core of sovereign European AI. In time, this will build common capacity and European champions from the ground up. The EU apparatus is also shifting into delivery mode, tying itself to deadlines for delivering the “One Europe, One Market Roadmap” aimed at leveraging the European market for geoeconomic strength. The long-awaited capital markets union is spurred on by a coalition of six major EU economies, potentially the beginning of an acceleration towards a multi-speed geopolitical EU. 

Then there is geography – critical to Europe’s geopolitical strength and sphere of influence. Here again, there is new movement, well beyond the post-Brexit reset with the UK. The recent Western Balkans Summit in Montenegro broke with enlargement fatigue for Montenegro and Albania, while providing fresh impetus for Moldova and Ukraine. Germany and France jointly proposing a gradual integration pathway is an important recognition that Europe’s geography demands a quick fait accompli even if a full acquis of membership under EU law remains a climb. 

Much can still go wrong for Europe’s momentum. New external shocks may yet emerge – on energy from the Gulf, on trade or NATO from the US, on industry from China, or on security from Russia. EU decision-making remains cumbersome and downstream of national politics. The leaders of the E3 may be voluntaristic, but they all face strong and potentially debilitating political headwinds at home. The discussion on the EU’s next multiannual budget may become toxic. But momentum can create tipping points. If European leaders grasp their window of opportunity before fresh shocks consume the political oxygen, 2026 may become a turning point for a truly geopolitical Europe. Fingers crossed.